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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit arises from a incident which occurred on May 29,2003 at an ice cream 
"cold storage warehouse" located in Salt Lake City, Utah owned by Asael Fair & Sons 
Company. It is alleged that "an electric condenser fan motor accidentally sheared off its 
mount and severed an ammonia line, thereby releasing ammonia which contaminated [Farr's 
ice cream] product stored therein, thereby rendering the same unmarketable and of no value. 
It is claimed that the damages sustained exceed the sum of $1,500,000. 
At the time of the loss, Farr was insured with Safeco Insurance Company and Hartford 
Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company. Because the insurance coverage with 
Safeco and Hartford was insufficient to cover the damages allegedly sustained in the loss, 
Farr seeks additional damages from Safeco and Hartford. 
Farr also seeks damages from other individuals, entities and insurance carriers 
including Auto Owners Insurance Company. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
1. Prior to May 29,2003, Farr had been insured through a subsidiary of Unitrin 
Multi-Lines Insurance (referred to in the pleadings as Unitrin Property & Casualty Insurance 
Group). (R. 734) 
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2. In March 2003, Trinity provided Fair with notice that the policy would not be 
renewed beyond the end of the then-in-effect coverage period: May 14, 2003 (i.e., the 
expiration date of the Trinity policy was 15 days before the Loss). (R. 744). 
3. In mid-March, Fair, through Duane "Dexter" Farr (hereinafter "Dexter"), Farr's 
CEO, commenced its efforts to obtain appropriate replacement coverage for both its Salt 
Lake City and Ogden, Utah operations. (R. 747-49). 
4. Dexter had gone through the "insurance procurement process" before and was 
familiar with this process. He testified that "you have to realize May 14 is when our renewal 
is. Insurance brokers usually start hitting us up two, three, four months in advance." (R. 
747). 
5. Dexter presented each agent with an outline of coverage which Farr had 
previously had with Unitrin, and he asked for (and demanded) an "apples-to-apples" 
comparison. (R. 757). 
6. Farr testified that the "apples-to-apples" comparison allowed him to look at the 
same coverage from the various insurers and to compare the price of such coverage. (R. 
757). 
7. During the efforts to replace its insurance coverage, Andrew L. Reed ("Reed"), 
a licensed, captive insurance agent associated with Farmers Insurance Group ("Farmers"), 
met with Dexter. (R.750-52) 
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8. Reed testified that he went through each of the particular coverages with Dexter: 
"we discussed . . . line by line, just about every coverage on the bid spec. Was it still 
appropriate, what changes have occurred?" (R. 773). 
9. Reed testified that he told Dexter that the bid specs were inadequate in 
comparison to Fair's potential exposure to loss. (R. 784). 
10. Because Reed was nervous that Farmers may not accept the Farr risk, in March 
2003, Reed contacted an independent insurance agent and business acquaintance, Steven 
Daniel Kirchen ("Kirchen") of Central Bonds and Insurance Agency ("Central Bonds"), to 
determine if Kirchen might be able to help place the Farr account if Farmers declined the 
risk. (R. 1842). 
11. Kirchen indicated "Yeah, I might have a market for it-there may have been 
several markets. But I wasn't sure. It was a very casual conversation." (R. 1842). 
12. In early- to mid-April, Reed was notified that Farmers would not write the 
coverage requested. (R. 1843). 
13. Reed contacted Kirchen and told him that Farmers had officially declined to 
write the business and that Reed was "looking for a home for it." (R. 1843). 
14. Reed was a captive agent for Farmers, meaning that he solely represented 
Farmers Insurance Group in the placement of insurance business. (R. 768). 
15. Reed was not authorized to, and did not, represent Auto Owners nor Owners 
Insurance Company. (R. 1143; 3028). 
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16. Despite the fact that Farmers would not write the risk, and Reed was a captive 
agent for Farmers, Reed wanted to be Farr's agent to "control" the entire Fair account. He 
wanted to be the insurance broker for all lines of coverage. (R. 672). 
17. Reed did not allow other agents he talked with (including Kirchen) to meet with 
Farr regarding the account (R. 672; 352). 
18. Kirchen never met with Farr. (R. 790). 
19. Kirchen told Reed that he would "go to market" and see if any of the companies 
with which he did business was interested in writing the coverage. (R. 1846). 
20. Kirchen contacted CNA, Allied and Auto Owners7. (R. 1847).. 
21. CNA declined to write the business because of a "time issue" — meaning that 
CNA needed more time than was available to properly estimate the risks involved and to set 
pricing for those risks. (R. 1847). 
22. Allied declined to write the policy because of concerns about prior ammonia 
losses, spoilage, and property values — among other things. (R. 1848). 
23. Kirchen also approached Auto Owners Insurance regarding this potential risk. 
(R. 1849). 
24. Central Bonds (Kirchen's insurance agency) has an in-house computer rating 
program which allows Kirchen to use information regarding a potential risk "to go in [to an 
1
 Auto Owners Insurance Company and Owners Insurance Company are related 
companies. For the purposes of this brief, the term "Auto Owners" will be used, unless the 
term "Owners" was specifically used in a quoted portion of a deposition. 
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Auto Owners computer program] and classify business, rate it up, price it out, [to estimate 
a preliminary premium] and then work with the underwriters on final pricing, coverages, 
etc." (R. 1849). 
25. On May 13th or 14th, "somewhere around there," Kirchen ran this Auto Owners 
rating program regarding the Farr risk and was able to determine an estimated, preliminary 
premium rate for coverage being evaluated, subject to final home office review, pricing, and 
approval. (R. 1850-51). 
26. Kirchen thought the coverage specified in the guidelines provided by Reed, 
especially the spoilage limit, was low. He brought it to Reed's attention. Reed told Kirchen 
that Farr only wanted (and demanded) an apples-to-apples comparison. (R. 1859). 
27. The application, loss runs, loss history, quotes, were submitted to Auto Owners 
home office for their review and consideration. "Any accounts over $50,000 or with high 
property values had to be referred up to home office" for its approval or rejection. (R. 1852). 
28. Kirchen provided information regarding the Farr account to underwriting at 
Auto Owners on May 13, 2003 or possibly "the day before" for their consideration. (R. 
1852). 
29. On May 14, 2003, Reed asked Dexter Farr to prepare two checks; one for 
$12,410.50 payable to Farmers for the commercial auto coverage and another check payable 
to Owners (a related company of Auto Owners) in the amount of $7,838.83 for property, 
liability and equipment breakdown coverages. (R. 1712 -13). 
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30. When Dexter received the request to write the check made payable to "Owners," 
he asked, "Who's Owners?" He thought the entire coverage was still being taken care of by 
Farmers. (R. 1713). 
31. Dexter testified: "He said I have to have the check made out to Owners, so I 
did." "Not'Owners Insurance Company.' Owners, that's all." (R. 1713). 
3 2. Later, Dexter indicated that the check was mistakenly made out to "Owners" and 
should have been made out to "Safeco." (R. 1714). 
33. Kirchen testified that, prior to May 14, 2003, he specifically told Reed that the 
Salt Lake location (the location of the loss) was not covered and that he was waiting for 
home office approval. (R. 836). 
34. Several days later and prior to the loss which is the subject of this matter, 
Kirchen received a call from the underwriting department at Auto Owners indicating that, 
after having reviewed the application and supporting documents, "home office had declined 
the coverage - - or the coverages." (R. 1853). 
3 5. Kirchen immediately called Reed and "explained to him that the home office had 
declined the coverage and we're not going to be able to write the account." (R. 1853). 
36. Kirchen's understanding was that Auto Owners had never issued any coverage 
and coverage was not bound by Auto Owners. (R. 825). 
37. Once the risk was declined, the check was returned in full, uncashed, to Reed. 
This return occurred prior to the loss which is the subject of this matter. (R. 1861). 
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38. At least as of May 23, Dexter knew that Owners had not issued a policy for 
insurance and knew that Auto Owners had not provided any coverage for any of the loss that 
was eventually sustained. (R. 3033) 
Claims Against Auto Owners 
39. In the Third Amended Complaint, Fair alleged that Reed was a duly authorized 
agent of Auto Owners. (R. 292). 
40. In the Third Amended Complaint, Farr alleged that, through Reed's actions, 
Auto Owners agreed, committed, and became jointly obligated to provide Farr with all "such 
necessary, available and appropriate insurance coverage for all of Plaintiff s Products and 
all of plaintiff s significant insurable risks." (R. 299). 
41. In the Third Amended Complaint, Farr alleged that Auto Owners, through the 
actions of Reed became jointly and severally obligated to a) diligently and professionally 
investigate and accurately determine the full nature and extent of plaintiff s significant 
insurable risks and to fully advise plaintiff of the same; b) to diligently and professionally 
investigate and accurately determine the full nature and extent of the insurance coverage that 
was available to cover such risks, to determine the costs thereof, and to fully advise plaintiff 
of the same; and c) to insure that plaintiff was fully informed and provided with all of such 
coverage or to confirm in writing plaintiffs determination, if any, after being so informed 
not to avail itself of such available coverage, or any portion thereof, not provided. (R. 300). 
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42. In the Third Amended Complaint, Farr alleged that Auto Owners "breached its 
contract" in connection with Reed's Commitment (Count I); was negligent in failing to 
accurately determine Fair's insurable risks, advise Fair of its insurable risks, and secure 
appropriate insurance for its insurable risks (Count II); acted in unspecified "bad faith" 
(Count III); failed "to issue to plaintiff a written binder to evidence the placement of the 
insurance coverage that was the subject of Reed's Commitment" and failed to provide 
plaintiff with a copy of the Safeco Policy until on or about June 20, 2003 - which afforded 
Farr no opportunity to review the express terms of the binder or the Safeco Policy until after 
the accident (Count IV). Third Amended Complaint. (R. 306 - 10). 
43. In response to Auto Owner's objection to Motion to file Fourth Amended 
Complaint, Farr admitted that it understood Auto Owners actions, at best, only constituted 
a "quote" for insurance and that coverage had never been provided by Auto Owners: 
Kirchen thereafter obtained proposals for the requested coverage from various 
insurance companies. One quote was obtained from defendant Auto Owners 
Insurance Company ("Owners"). Owners, however, would not provide 
certain coverage needed by plaintiff as part of the Owners policy. As such, 
Kirchen sought to obtain the coverage from Travelers. Written proposals were 
thereafter obtained from both Owners and Travelers. 
(Emphasis added). Memorandum, pg. 3. (R. 873). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Andy Reed, the only insurance agent to deal with Farr, was not authorized to (and did 
not) represent Auto Owners. He did not have actual authority to represent Auto Owners in 
dealing with Auto Owner insurance products. 
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Reed did not have apparent authority to represent Auto Owners. For apparent 
authority to exist, Auto Owners would have needed to take affirmative steps leading others 
(including Fair) to conclude that Reed had authority to act for Auto Owners. Auto Owners 
took no such steps and gave no such impression. 
Auto Owners did not have a contractual relationship with Farr. Kirchen's activities 
regarding the Farr account, at best, were simply efforts to obtain sufficient information to 
enable Auto Owners' home office to evaluate whether to accept the Farr risk. 
There was no binder of insurance issued. A "binder" is a writing which describes the 
subject and amount of insurance and temporarily binds insurance coverage pending the 
issuance of an insurance policy. There is no Auto Owners binder regarding the Farr account. 
There is no oral contract of insurance. To form an oral contract of insurance, the 
prerequisites to form any contract are required including an offer, acceptance, meeting of the 
minds and consideration. At best, the application to Auto Owners is merely an offer on the 
part of the applicant to purchase insurance. Here, the application was submitted to Auto 
Owners' home office for review and approval or rejection. Home office timely rejected the 
application for insurance. 
Auto Owners was not required to cancel a binder or oral contract of insurance. Farr 
did not have coverage through Auto Owners - either by way of "binder" or "oral contract of 
insurance." Consequently, there was no contract of insurance to cancel. 
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The trial correctly found, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no 
genuine issues of material fact are in dispute and Auto Owners is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Reed Was Not An Actual Agent 
for Auto Owners Insurance Company 
In the Third Amended Complaint Farr alleges that Reed was a duly authorized agent 
of Auto Owners and that because of this "agency relationship/5 Auto Owners is responsible 
for Reed's alleged failure to secure "all necessary, available and appropriate insurance 
coverage for all of Plaintiff s Products and . . . significant insurable risks/5 and fox Reed's 
failure to provide Farr with a copy of the Safeco Policy until after the accident which is the 
subject of this lawsuit. Reed was not an agent for Auto Owners and was never authorized 
to act on its behalf. 
In the deposition taken of Andrew Reed, he specifically acknowledged that he was 
NOT an Agent for Auto Owners nor for Owners Insurance Company. Reed deposition, pp. 
(R. 1506). 
Q. Now, you had never represented Owners Insurance Company, had you? 
A. No. 
Q. Had never represented Auto Owners Insurance Company. 
A. No. 
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Regarding the specific allegations contained in the Third Amended Complaint, and 
which Farr has alleged in its brief, Reed was specifically asked about his relationship with 
Auto Owners and again affirmed that he was not an agent duly authorized to represent Auto 
Owners. (R. 334; 750). 
In fact, Andrew Reed, at all times material hereto, was a "captive agent" for Farmers 
Insurance. "I was a captive agent, which means I solely represent Farmers Insurance 
Group." Emphasis added. (R. 750.) . 
Reed did not represent Auto Owners Insurance Company nor Owners Insurance 
Company. Contrary to the assertions in Farr's Third Amended Complaint, there was no 
evidence adduced through discovery nor presented to the trial court to establish that Reed 
was authorized to act on behalf of Auto Owners. The trial court correctly found that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute concerning Reed's lack of capacity to 
represent Auto Owners and correctly concluded that Auto Owners was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
Reed Was Not an Insurance Producer for 
Auto Owners Insurance Company 
In its brief, Farr refers this Court to the statutory terms "Insurance Producer" or 
"Producer" contained in Utah Code Annotated §31A-l-301(84)(a) and (b)(i) [sic]2 and 
2Farr's brief also mistakenly uses the citation Utah Code Annotated §31 A-l-
301(86)(a)(i). On page 37 of Farr's brief, Farr refers to the definition of "insurer" and 
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implies that such definitions somehow impose liability on Auto Owners for the alleged acts 
of Reed. Rather than support Fair's proposition, these statutes support Auto Owner's claim 
that Reed was not an insurance producer for Auto Owners, was not authorized to act on its 
behalf and Auto Owners is not responsible for his acts nor for his alleged errors and/or 
omissions. 
An "insurance producer" may be a "producer for the insurer" [§31 A-l-301(87)(b)(i)] 
or a "producer for the insured" [§31 A-1-301 (87)(b)(ii)]. A "producer for the insurer" is a 
producer who "is compensated directly or indirectly by an insurer for selling soliciting, or 
negotiating any product of that insurer"' §31A-l-301(87)(b)(i). The mere fact that a 
producer is compensated by any insurer does not make him an insurance producer for all 
insurers. Rather, an insurance producer is a producer for the insurer only if the agent is 
compensated by that insurer. A producer who receives no compensation from an insurer 
is not a producer for that insurer. 
In regards to the Fair account, Reed did not expect to (and did not) receive any kind 
of commission from Auto Owners for his services. Reed deposition vol. 1, p. 95; vol 2, pp. 
482-83. Even in regards to the Safeco policy which was eventually obtained, Reed testified: 
Q. Did you receive any portion of the premium that was paid-
A. You mean the commission? 
references Utah Code Annotaed §31 A-1-301(86). The correct citation, dealing with 
"insurance producer" or "producer" is Utah Code Annotated §31A-l-301(87)(a) and the 
correct citation dealing with "insurer" is Utah Code Annotated §31A-1-301(89). 
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Q. Any portion of the commission that was paid for the Safeco policy? 
A. None whatsoever. 
Andy Reed deposition, vol. 1, p. 52. 
During his interaction with Farr, Reed was a "captive agent" for Farmers. He was to 
be compensated only by Farmers. He was an insurance producer for Farmers. He was not 
an insurance producer for Auto Owners. 
Reed was not authorized to receive, was not expecting to receive, and did not receive, 
any compensation "directly or indirectly " from Auto Owners "for selling, soliciting, or 
negotiating any product o f Auto Owners. Utah Code Annotated §31 A-1-301 (87)(b)(i). 
Auto Owners is not responsible for Reed's alleged failure to secure "all necessary, 
available and appropriate insurance coverage for all of Plaintiff s Products and... significant 
insurable risks." 
POINT III 
Reed Was Not An Apparent Nor Common-Law Agent 
for Auto Owners Insurance Company 
In its appellate brief, Farr claims that (but does not explain how) "Auto-Owners also 
became liable to Farr for the acts and omissions of Reed as Kirchen's, Central Bond's and 
Auto Owner's apparent and/or common law agent." Farr appellate brief p. 38. Again, there 
are no facts upon which to base this bold, unsupported, allegation. 
To impose apparent authority on an insurance agent one must do more than simply 
make an allegation of apparent authority. In 44 CJ.S. Insurance §280, a three-pronged test 
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is recognized to establish apparent authority of an insurance agent. That treatise states, in 
relevant part: 
The three-pronged test for apparent authority, requires company conduct 
indicating the agent's authority, insured's reasonable reliance on the agent's 
acts, assurances or representations, and a detrimental change in insured's 
position as a result of such reliance. Thus, an insurance intermediary does not 
have the apparent authority to act on behalf of the insurance company or to 
bind it by his or her acts, statements or representations, where the company 
does not knowingly permit the intermediary to exercise authority or act on its 
behalf, or to act beyond the limited scope of his or her authority, or where the 
company does not directly communicate with alleged insured, or wrhere insured 
or a third party does not believe or is not led into believing that the 
intermediary is acting on behalf of the company, or where no reliance by 
insured on the statement or representation of the intermediary has occurred. 
The indicia of an agent's apparent authority include but are not limited to the 
presence of the company's sign in the agent's office, indicating a general 
agency, use of the company's stationery, use of preprinted application forms 
bearing the company's name, issuance of the company's coverage to insured, 
and acceptance of premiums on behalf of the company. 
Emphasis added. 
In order for there to be apparent authority, the insurance company must take steps 
from which an insured could reasonably conclude that the agent has authority to represent 
the insurer. Acts or statements of the agent alone, without confirmatory acts by the company, 
are insufficient to establish apparent authority. 
In Northington v. Dairvland Ins. Co., 445 So.2d 283 (Ala. 1984) the Alabama 
Supreme Court considered a case where an automobile owner brouglit an action alleging 
breach of contract and fraud against an automobile insurer and an insurance agent for the 
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agent's failure to obtain automobile insurance coverage for her. In rejecting the claim for 
coverage against the insurer, the Court stated: 
The doctrine of apparent authority does not rest upon what one thinks an 
agent's authority may be, or what the agent holds out his authority to be; 
rather, the doctrine of apparent authority is based on the principal's holding the 
agent out to a third person as having the authority under which he acts. The 
following statement on the doctrine of apparent authority is found in 
AmJur.2d, Agency, Sec. 74, p. 476: 
The apparent power of an agent is to be determined by the acts 
of the principal, and not by the acts of the agent; a principal is 
responsible for the acts of an agent within his apparent 
authority only where the principal by his acts or conduct has 
clothed the agent with the appearance of authority, and not 
where the agent's own conduct and statements have created 
the apparent authority.'" 
'Apparent authority' is such as a principal knowingly permits 
an agent to assume or holds out as possessing. It seems to be 
generally held that an agent's apparent authority must be based 
upon the conduct of the principal and not of the agent. 2A 
C.J.S. Agency § 161; 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency §75. 
These statements indicate that in order for a principal to be held liable under 
the doctrine of apparent authority and estoppel, the principal must have 
engaged in some conduct which led a third party to believe that the agent had 
authority to act for the principal. Reviewing the record, we find no evidence 
whatsoever that Dairy land indicated to Ms. Northington or led her to believe 
that Mr. Wills had authority to act for the company in the manner in which he 
acted. No one, other than Mr. Wills, made any representations to Ms. 
Northington or engaged in any conduct on behalf of Dairyland in this case. 
Since an agent's apparent authority must be based on conduct of the principal 
and not of the agent, and Dairyland engaged in no conduct which gave the 
impression of Wills's authority, we hold that Dairyland is not liable for Wills's 
representations. 
At pp 285-86. 
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Utah case law has expressed a similar approach to these issues. In Bodell Const. Co. 
v.Stewart Title Guar. Co.. 945 P.2d 119 (C.A. Utah 1997) the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
[A]n agent's apparent... authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the 
principal." Zions FirstNatl Bankv. Clark Clinic Corp., 762P.2d 1090,1095 
(Utah 1988). "The authority of the agent [is not] 'apparent' merely because 
it looks so to the person with whom he deals. It is the principal who must 
cause third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority. 
. . . It follows that one who deals exclusively with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's 
representations, /d (quoting City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 
672 P.2d 89, 80 (Utah 1983). 
Here, Auto Owners took no steps to indicate that Reed had authority to act on its 
behalf. Farr never talked with anyone from Auto Owners. (R. 3031). Farr didn't even have 
any conversations with Auto Owner's appointed agent, Kirchen. (R. 3032). Dexter did not 
even know who Mr. Kirchen was. (R. 3032). 
There was no indicia of Reed's apparent authority to represent Auto Owners. There 
were no Auto Owner's company's signs in Reed's office indicating a general agency3. Reed 
was not authorized to use (and did not use) Auto Owner's company's stationery. Reed did 
not hold himself out as representing Auto Owners. In fact, Farr testified that he thought, 
right up to the time he was asked by Reed to write the check to "Owners," that Farmers was 
still providing coverage for the risk. When Dexter received the request to write the check 
made payable to "Owners," he asked, "Who's Owners?" He thought the entire coverage was 
still being taken care of by Farmers. (R. 1713). Dexter testified: "He said I have to have the 
3Farr never went to Kirchen's office. Again, Farr dealt only with Reed. 
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check made out to Owners, so I did." "Not 'Owners Insurance Company.5 Owners, that's 
all." (R. 1713)4. 
Here, there was no conduct by Auto Owners to indicate that Reed had any authority 
to act on its behalf. He had no such authority. There are no genuine issues of material fact 
in dispute in this regard and, as a matter of law, as the court correctly determined, Reed did 
not have apparent authority to represent Auto Owners. 
Point IV 
Farr Never Had a Contract 
With Auto Owners Insurance Company for this Risk 
Farr claims that coverage was orally bound on May 17,2003. Appellant brief, p. 38. 
The issue of whether a contract exists is a matter of law. See, Nunley v. Westates 
Casing Servs.. Inc. 1999 UT 100,117,989 P.2d 1077 ("Whether a contract has been formed 
is ultimately a conclusion of law...); Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah 
1986) (same). The formation of an oral contract requires all of the elements necessary to 
constitute an agreement, as with any other contract. In Harris v. Albrecht 2004 UT 13, 86 
P0.3d 728 (2004), the Utah Supreme Court, quoting an Indiana Appeals court, stated: 
Where a person seeks to enter into a contract of insurance with an insurance 
company or its agent it is understood that the negotiations will not ripen into 
a contact until the parties arrive at an agreement as to all of the elements which 
are essential to an insurance contact, including the subject matter to be 
4Later, Dexter claimed that the check was mistakenly made out to "Owners" 
and should have been made out to "Safeco." (R. 1714). 
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covered, the risk insured against, the amount of the indemnity, the duration of 
the coverage and the premium. 
v-
This recognition is in keeping with general insurance law principles that "an 
application for insurance is merely an offer on the part of the applicant to purchase 
insurance." See, for example, Mobile Airport Authority v. Health Strategies, Inc. 886 So.2d 
773 (Ala. 2004) ["an application for insurance constituted merely an offer on the part of the 
applicant to purchase insurance"]; Allstate Ins. Co., v. Estate of Hancock, 345 S.C. 81, 545 
S.E.2d 845 (2001) ["an application for insurance is merely an offer; no contract arises until 
the offer is accepted and all conditions precedent are met"]; and Smith v. Colonial Ins. Co. 
Of California, 258 Va 30, 515 S.E.2d 775 (Mo.App. 1939) ["An application for insurance 
is merely an offer to enter into a contract."]. 
Point V 
There Was No Binder between Farr and 
Auto Owners Insurance Company for this Risk 
It is important to note that Utah Code Annotated §31 A-21-102(l) defines "binder." 
"Binder" means a writing which describes the subject and amount of insurance 
and temporarily binds insurance coverage pending the issuance of an insurance 
policy. "Binder" does not include conditional receipts by life insurance 
companies under which issuance of the policy or coverage under the policy is 
contingent upon the acceptability of the risk to the insurer. 
18 
A "binder" is a writing. In order for there to be a binder, a writing must set forth the 
subject and amount of insurance and [the binder] must "temporarily bind insurance coverage 
pending the issuance of an insurance policy." 
Here, there is no "writing which describes the subject and amount of insurance" which 
"temporarily binds insurance coverage pending the issuance of an insurance policy." No 
evidence was submitted to the trial court which would support a finding that a "binder" 
existed in this matter. There are no genuine issues of material fact in this regard. 
Point VI 
There is No Oral Contract of Insurance between Farr 
and Auto Owners Insurance Company for this Risk 
Farr claims that there is an "oral contract of insurance." Utah Code Annotated §31A-
21-102(2) states: 
Binding oral contracts of insurance may only be made as to casualty insurance, 
liability insurance, property insurance, vehicle insurance, workers' 
compensation insurance, and as to combinations of these coverages. The 
insurer shall issue a policy or binder as soon as reasonably possible after 
negotiation of any oral contract under this subsection. 
Although Farr claims that an oral contract of insurance was reached on May 14,2003, 
the actual facts - as a matter of law - do not support that proposition. 
Although the law recognizes "oral contracts of insurance," oral contracts of insurance, 
are subject to the same requirements of other contracts. In Harris v. Albrecht 86 P.3d 728, 
2004 UT 13, the Court observed: 
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The formation of a contract requires a meeting of the minds. In Bulla v. 
Donahue, 174 Ind.App. 123, 366 NJE.2d 233, 236 (1977), the court stated: 
Where a person seeks to enter into a contact of insurance with 
an insurance company or its agent it is understood that the 
negotiations will not ripen into a contract until the parties 
arrive at an agreement as to all of the elements which are 
essential to an insurance contract, including the subject matter 
to be covered, the risk insured against, the amount of the 
indemnity, the duration of the coverage and the premium. 
Hasmmacher v. Tumy, 222 Or.341, 352 P.2d 493, 497 (1960). We conclude 
that no contract of insurance existed between Harris and Albrecht. They did 
not discuss any of the elements essential to an insurance contract except that 
Harris "wanted business and fire coverage on [the] equipment and the 
contents" of his architectural business. There was no mention, except fire, of 
the types of risks Harris wanted covered, the amount of indemnity, the duration 
of coverage, or the premium. Therefore, there was no meeting of the minds 
on which to base a contract of insurance. 
19. 
In Yates v. Whitten Valley Rental Corp.. 226 Va. 436, 309 S.E. 2d 330 (1983), the 
Supreme Court of Virginia noted at least six "necessary elements of an oral contract of 
insurance" as 1) the names of the parties to the contract, 2) the subject of the insurance; 3) 
the risks insured against; 4) the time at which the insurance takes effect and the length of 
time it is to continue; 5) a statement of the premium; and 6) the conditions pertaining to the 
insurance. At page 437. The Court then continued: 
In order to establish an oral contract of insurance each element listed above 
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
At page 438. 
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In Rouse v. Household Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68,156 P.3d 569 (Idaho 2007), the 
Idaho Supreme Court considered a case where Rouse's claimed coverage was afforded under 
an oral contract of insurance. In rejecting the claim, the Court noted: 
A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation on intent to contract 
which takes the form of an offer and acceptance. The Rouses, however, have 
offered no evidence that a contract was formed. 
Here, there is simply no evidence that there was a meeting of the minds. The 
language of the applications the Rouse's signed at closing makes clear that the 
applications may or may not be approved. These applications were titled 
"Notice of Proposed Group Disability Insurance" and "Notice of Proposed 
Group life Insurance." They both provided that if the application was 
approved, the effective date would be the date of application, that if the 
application was not approved "any premium . . . paid will be refunded... or 
credited to your account," and that the insurance benefits summarized on the 
application "will only apply if your application for insurance is approved." 
Likewise, the Optional Credit Insurance Disclosure attached to the refinancing 
agreement provided: "there will be no insurance until the insurer has approved 
your application (if one is required)..." The Rouses were later sent a letter 
indicating that their applications had been denied and received a refund of their 
premiums. 
The Rouses failed to show evidence of acceptance. 
At page 571. 
Here, there was no discussion (at all) between Farr and Auto Owners. There was no 
discussion (at all) between Farr and Kirchen. There certainly was no meeting of the minds 
concerning the risks to be covered by the policy (hence, the litigation now between Farr and 
defendants, whereby Farr is seeking to avoid the limitations imposed by the written 
contracts). Kirchen knew, and testified that he told Reed, that coverage would NOT be 
afforded until home office approved the risk. He specifically told him that the Salt Lake 
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facility (the location of the loss in question) was not "in place." He had no authority on his 
own to bind this risk, had no authority to enter into an oral contract of insurance, and had no 
authority to authorize others to accept this risk. Home office approval from Auto Owners was 
required before this risk could be accepted. When home office reviewed the submitted 
documents, home office rejected the risk. 
There was, as a matter of law, no oral contract of insurance. 
Point VII 
There Was No Binder nor Oral Contract of Insurance 
Between Farr and Auto Owners Insurance Company to Cancel 
Fair claims that Auto Owners failed to properly cancel the binder. Appellant's brief, 
pg. 38. Utah Code Annotated §31A-21-102(5) states: 
A binder may be cancelled by the insurer prior to its expiration date only in the 
same manner as and subject to the same restrictions that apply to insurance 
policies under Section 312A-21-3 03. 
The simply response to this is, as mentioned above, there was no "binder." 
A "binder means "a writing." There was no "writing." There was no "binder" to be 
cancelled. 
There was no "oral contact of insurance" to be cancelled. Again, Utah Code 
Annotated §31A-21-102(2) states that an insurer "shall issue a policy or binder as soon as 
reasonably possible after negotiation of any oral contract under this subsection." Auto 
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Owners didn't issue a binder (a writing) nor an oral contract of insurance. Three was no 
policy issued after the alleged "oral contract of insurance." The risk which was presented 
to Auto Owners was being evaluated and considered by the home office. Home office did 
not accept the risk. Home office rejected the proposed risk. There was no "oral contract of 
insurance" to be cancelled. 
Fair (and Reed) knew there was no coverage afforded by Auto Owners - and 
consequently hurriedly acted to get coverage in place with Safeco. That coverage was bound 
and the policy issued. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Other than conclusory 
allegations, Appellant's brief has failed to identify any genuine issue of material fact in 
dispute. The law firmly supports the trial court's decision, pursuant to Rule 56 Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure that Auto Owners is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Reed was not authorized to, and did not, act for Auto Owners. He was a captive agent 
who was only authorized to act for Farmers. He had no actual nor apparent authority to act 
for Auto Owners. Auto Owners took no steps to impliedly acknowledge or lead others to 
believe that Reed had authority to act for it. 
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Kirchen did not have, nor did he represent that he had, authority to bind coverage for 
the Farr risk. He knew (and told Reed) that home office approval was required to approve 
this risk. Home office did not approve the risk, but rejected it. 
Timely - and before the loss occurred - Kirchen notified Reed that Auto Owners 
would not accept the risk. The check which Reed had obtained was timely returned to Farr 
before the loss occurred. 
Kirchen did not bind coverage. Kirchen did not enter into an oral contact of 
insurance. There was no meeting of the minds regarding the risk which Reed wanted 
Kirchen to present to Auto Owners. No contract of insurance was formed. 
The trial court correctly held, pursuant to Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact. The trial court correctly held that Auto Owners 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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